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Family Conflicts: The Role of Religion in
Refusing Medical Treatment for Minors
JENNIFER E. CHEN*
INTRODUCTION
The rebellious teenager is a familiar icon in American culture. In a
society that inconsistently treats adolescents as adults in some areas and
as children in others, the struggle for independence continues until
minors reach the legal age of autonomy at eighteen.' Until that age, in
many areas of legal significance, the minor is subject to the decisions of
his or her parents.
Traditionally, minors are completely subject to their parents' will
when it comes to their own healthcare treatment. Often this does not
pose a problem because most parents will make decisions that are in the
best interests of their children and consistent with societal values that
parents should obtain the best medical treatment available when their
child is critically ill.' Cases exist, however, where parents have refused
medical treatment for their child because of their sincerely held religious
beliefs. Based on constitutional rights, parents have a certain degree of
leeway to make these treatment refusal decisions,3 and in no published
case to date has a child asserted a treatment preference contrary to that
of his or her parents refusing treatment on religious grounds. Thus,
courts have yet to deal with the scenario of a disagreement between
parents and child over a religious-based decision to refuse medical
treatment.
This Note examines the intersection of competing interests and
individual rights involved in such decisions. Two possible scenarios are
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007; B.A., University
of California, Berkeley, 1998. Many thanks to Professor Lois A. Weithorn for her feedback and
guidance, and to the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work and support. Thanks also to
BOB. Without you I never would have made it through the last three years.
i. For example, for certain crimes children can be legally tried as adults. For a history of juvenile
justice, see Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions
from Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 958-67 (2006).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II.A.
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addressed here. In the first scenario, the parents refuse treatment based
on religion, while the child desires to be treated. In the second scenario,
the parents seek treatment for their child, but the child asserts a religious
right to refuse treatment.
Part I of this Note provides a background on the development of
current approaches that courts take when balancing parental rights, state
interests, and the minor's rights. Part II will focus on healthcare decision-
making. First, Part II will briefly summarize the statutory exemptions
that protect the parents' right to refuse treatment for their child based on
sincere religious beliefs, and then it will examine how various courts
interpret and apply the statutes. Next, it will review the mature minor
doctrine and arguments for and against allowing adolescents to make
their own treatment decisions. Part II will also look at cases where courts
granted or refused the adolescent's right to make his own decision. Part
III will look at the free exercise rights of minors, considering both the
legal and psychological issues. Part III will briefly summarizing the free
exercise rights of adults and then compare them to those of minors.
Psychological literature will also provide an understanding of when
adolescents are determined to have their own identity and beliefs.
Examining these different doctrines together, Part IV argues that parents
should not be allowed to refuse treatment based on religious reasons for
an adolescent child who desires treatment and also that adolescents
should not be granted the right to refuse treatment for religious reasons
in life-threatening situations, when the parents are seeking treatment.
I. BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE FAMILY AND THE STATE
Over eighty years ago, the Supreme Court established in Meyer v.
Nebraska that parents have a constitutional right to control the
upbringing of their children.' Since then, the Court has upheld this right,
by limiting state interference in parental decisions regarding the
education, religion, association, and healthcare of their children Most
4. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
protections include the right to "establish a home and bring up children"). In Meyer, the Court
overturned a state law prohibiting teaching in any language other than English. using substantive due
process to find that the statute violated the parents' rights to make decisions for their children. Id. at
399-401; accord ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 654 (1997)
(discussing the Meyer case).
5. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2000) (holding that statute allowing state
judge to determine when visitation by grandparents is appropriate; regardless of what the parent
believes is in the child's best interest, violates the due process clause); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
694 (1979) (explaining that parents must maintain a dominant role in deciding whether children should
be committed to mental health facilities); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (972) (stating that
our society places a high value on "parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of
their children"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (I944) ("It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-535 (1925) (acknowledging that parents have a liberty "to direct the upbringing and
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recently, in Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court upheld the principle
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions about the care, custody,
and control of their children.",6 Three common presumptions support this
longstanding tradition of deference to parental discretion.7 First, minors
are presumed to be immature and inexperienced. Second, adult parents
possess the experience and judgment capacity to direct their children.9
Last, parents generally make decisions that are in the "best interests"" of
their children." These presumptions, along with the Court's rulings,
provide significant legal and social justifications for parental autonomy.
While the Court recognizes the fundamental right of parents to make
child-raising decisions, in accordance with modern principles of
constitutional law, the Court will apply strict scrutiny-whether the
state's action is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest-to
determine whether the state can intervene in family decisions."
education of children under their control"); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-401 (overturning the application of
a statute prohibiting the teaching of languages other than English because it infringed on fundamental
rights).
6. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. The Troxel court declared the parents' liberty interest in raising their
children to be "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Id. at
65.
7. Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Troubled and
Troublesome Youth, 33 HoPSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1394 (2005).
8. Id.
9. Id.; see, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 ("The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions.").
iO. Weithorn, supra note 7, at 1394; see, e.g., In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1i55, 1 57 (Mass. App. Ct.
1999) (laying out the criteria for determining the best interests of a child in Massachusetts).
ii. Weithorn, supra note 7, at 1394; see, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 ("There is a presumption that
fit parents act in best interests of their children." (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602)); see also Jennifer L.
Rosato, Let's Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment in Health Care
Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 771-772 (2002) [hereinafter Rosato, Adolescent
Empowerment]; Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should
Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 7 (2000)
[hereinafter Rosato, Bioethics].
12. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 644 (strict scrutiny is defined as whether the state's action is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70 (discussing the
lower court's error in interfering in the parent's fundamental rights to make decisions for the child
because it failed to give proper weight to the parent's determination and lacked a compelling interest
to determine that visitation rights of grandparents are in the child's best interests). However, states do
not automatically win simply because they can point to a compelling interest. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). The state must also show that its interest will be adversely affected. Id. In the
absence of such a showing, the state will not be allowed to impinge on the parents' fundamental rights
and interests. Id. For example, in Yoder, the state's purpose in compulsory education was to prepare
children to be productive members of society. Id. at 213. However, the Court found convincing
evidence to support the Amish claim that forgoing one or two years of school would not impair the
child physically or mentally, nor result in the child's inability to mature into a self-supporting
individual, nor in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society. Id. at 234. Based on this
finding, the court deferred to the parents' decision because there was no provable harm to the state's
February 2007]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS VS. STATE INTERESTS
Initially, the jurisprudence dealing with protecting minors involved
balancing the interests of the parents against those of the state.'" While
the parents' rights stood on Fourteenth Amendment protections, the
state's interests originated in the traditional parens patriae authority.'4
Under parens patriae, the state is empowered to act as a guardian for
members of society who are unable to protect their own interests, and
children naturally fall into this category.'" Thus, the state's interest in
protecting the welfare of children gives the government a reason to
intervene in the family.' 6 In Prince v. Massachusetts, the first major case
establishing the balance between government and parental interests, the
Court acknowledged the state's interest, saying that because a
"democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all
that implies," the government can "secure this against impeding
restraints and dangers, within a broad range of selection.'' 7
In Prince, the Supreme Court faced the problem of weighing a
parent's free exercise rights as applied to raising a child against the
state's interest to protect the welfare of the child.'8 The case dealt with
the conviction of an adult for violating child labor laws by allowing a
interest. Id. at 236.
13. See Yoder, 4o6 U.S. at 213-14; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (944).
14. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
15. Weithorn, supra note 7, at 1402-03.
16. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. The Court declared that it is in "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that end." Id. The Court justified the
authority by reasoning that "[i]t is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that
children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and
independent well-developed men and citizens." Id.; accord LAINIE FREEDMAN Ross, CHILDREN,
FAMILIES, AND HEALTHCARE DECISION MAKING 135 (0998) ("When parents make decisions which are
contrary to their child's basic interests, the state as parens patriae, has the right to intervene."). For a
discussion on the state's authority to regulate children and families based on the state's dual parens
patriae and police power interests, see Weithorn, supra note 7, at 1401-07. See also Susan D. Hawkins,
Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2084-86 (1996) (discussing the state's role as parens patriae and state
interests that support intervention into the parent-child relationship).
17. Prince, 321 U.S. at 68.
I8. Id. at 166. In Prince, the state interest was manifested in a statute that prohibited any girl
under the age of eighteen from selling or offering to sell "any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or
any other articles of merchandise.., in any street or public place." Id. at 16o-6i. Sarah Prince, a
guardian to her nine-year-old niece, Betty, was convicted of violating these state labor laws when the
two were found preaching and selling religious literature on the sidewalk during the evening. Id. at
i59-6o, 162. Mrs. Prince and Betty claimed that they were exercising their freedom of religion rights
under the First Amendment, testifying that they were both ordained ministers "exercising [their] God-
given right and [their] constitutional right to preach the gospel." Id. at 161-62. However, the Court
upheld the statute and Mrs. Prince's conviction, finding that the potential harm from the "crippling




child to accompany her in the evening while distributing religious
literature on the sidewalks.'9 Although evidence proved that the child
willingly participated in the activity," the Court weighed the competing
interests by balancing "[t]he parent's conflict with the state over control
of the child."2' The parent and child were in agreement, and it made
sense for the Court to assume that the parent would represent the child's
interests.22 Thirty years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court took
similar steps in a case involving the education of adolescents.23 In
determining whether the state could compel Amish teenagers to attend
school beyond the eighth grade, the Court weighed the state interest in
mandating continued secondary education against the parents' right to
free exercise of religion.24
The Court's focus on the fundamental rights of parents reveals its
view that children's interests are best protected when represented by
their parents' interests. An additional or alternative explanation for the
focus on the parents' interests could be that the Court failed to seriously
examine the minors' interests because the minors were not parties in the
cases. 5 Also, in many cases, the facts illustrated or the court assumed
that the parents and minor shared identical interests, so protecting the
parents' interests would also protect the the minor's interests." However,
19. Id. at 159-6o, 162.
20. Id. at 162.
21. Id. at 165.
22. Id. at 162.
23. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-32 (1972). Chief Justice Burger makes it clear that the
majority opinion does not consider the potential competing interests of the children. Id.
24. Id. at 213-14.
25. In Prince, the state prosecuted the child's guardian for child labor law violations stemming
from an incident where a child distributed religious literature on the street. Thus, the Court focused on
the conflicting interests between the free exercise rights of the guardian against the state's interests,
rather than directly considering the interests of the child. Prince, 321 U.S. at 159, 166. During a dispute
over child visitation rights, the Court focused on a mother's fundamental liberty interests rather than
the children's associational rights because the dispute was between the children's grandparents and the
mother. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2ooo). In overturning the ruling, the Court pointed
out the error of the lower court, which "gave no special weight at all to [the mother's] determination of
her daughters' best interests." Id. at 69. In determining whether Amish children could stop attending
high school early, in violation of the state's compulsory education laws, the court upheld the parents'
traditional interests with respect to the religious upbringing of their children because it was the parents
who were prosecuted by the state. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231-32 ("The children are not parties to this
litigation."). In another case the Court struck down criminal prosecution under a state law that
forbade the instruction of any language other than English prior to eighth grade, finding that this
provision infringed on a parent's fundamental right to instruct their children in their native tongue.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923). The Court also found that legislation that forced
children to attend public schools unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to
educate their children. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
26. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 162-63. Both the adult and the child had similar interests, arguing that
they acted within their free exercise rights when they distributed religious literature on the street.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-31 (explaining that the holding deals only with the parents' rights to free
exercise and that relevant testimony showed that one child's wishes corresponded with their parents);
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the lack of direct consideration for minors' preferences when their
interests were at stake implied that a minor had no separate or individual
interests apart from those that were inherently protected by his or her
parents' interests. Justice Douglas addressed these issues in his dissenting
opinion in Yoder, arguing that the Court should recognize the child's
separate right: "Where the child is mature enough to express potentially
conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit
such an imposition without canvassing his views."27 In Justice Douglas's
view, it did not matter whether the parent and child were in agreement,
because reaching a certain point of maturity should trigger the protection
of certain rights for the child. s While Yoder dealt with religious freedom,
the issue in Troxel was the right of association, and in his dissent, Justice
Stevens expressed a similar view regarding the acknowledgement of
children's interests: "[T]o the extent parents and families have
fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships,
so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests
be balanced in the equation." 9
Although the Court in Yoder hesitated to examine the children's
interests, cases after Yoder involved children as parties with differing
interests from their parents. This opened the door for the Court to move
from a dyadic to a triadic balance.
B. TRIADIC BALANCING: RECOGNIZING THE CHILD'S SEPARATE INTERESTS
In the cases above, the Court treated the interests of the parents and
children as a unified private interest to be weighed against the
government's interest. Presuming that the child lacks maturity and
parents act to promote the best interests of the child," it follows that the
child's interests are incorporated within the parents' interests. However,
as minors mature into adolescence, it becomes less clear that protecting
their parents' rights will automatically protect their rights, particularly
when a conflict exists between the parents and child.3 ' Seven years after
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (focusing on the right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of
their children); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 4oo (framing the issue as a parent's right to engage a teacher to
instruct their children without examining the individual child's wishes).
27. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
28. Id. ("And, if an Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature enough to have that
desire respected, the State may well be able to override the parents' religiously motivated
objections."). While Justice Douglas is not clear on the age or criteria to determine the proper stage of
maturity, the adolescents in Yoder were ages fourteen and fifteen. Id. at 207.
29. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. See supra Part II.
31. Justice Stevens acknowledged in Troxel that children may have interests separate from their
parents and that courts should consider these interests. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. In
the context of parents having educational decisions over adolescent children, Justice Douglas also
pointed out the importance of giving the child an opportunity to be heard because her desires may
conflict with those of her parents, noting that "[i]t is the future of the student, not the future of the
[Vol. 58:643
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Yoder, the Supreme Court examined this issue and applied a triadic
balancing test to separately examine the interests of the parents, child,
and the state.32
In Parham v. J.R., the Supreme Court weighed private interests
against the government's interest in the context of parents who sought to
place their children in state-administered mental institutions.33 One
major factor, which distinguished Parham from previous cases like Prince
or Yoder, was that some of the actual plaintiffs were minor children.34
Because the minors were included as parties, the Parham court had to
recognize their separate interests.35 Thus, in the balance of private versus
government interests, the Court found that "the private interest at stake
is a combination of the child's and parents' concerns. ' '36 However, while
the Court acknowledged the child's rights and interests in not being
committed, they found that these rights were "inextricably linked with
the parents' interest in and obligation for the welfare and health of the
child., 37  While noting that jurisprudence historically reflected the
concepts of a family unit with parents having broad authority over
minors, the court also recognized the danger that parents may act against
the interests of their children, justifying giving states "constitutional
control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their
physical or mental health is jeopardized. ' '3" However, because there was
no record or evidence of bad faith by any parents, the Court was not
persuaded to transfer decision-making power away from the parents, and
despite their examination of the children's contrary interests the Court
ultimately deferred to the parents.39 While the case resulted in a decision
that favored the parents' decisions over those of the child, the Court took
the initial step of looking to the child's preferences and including them
parents, that is imperiled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the
grade school .... [t]he child may decide that that is the preferred course, or he may rebel." Yoder, 406
U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,587, 6oo (1979).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 587-88.
35. Id. at 6oo.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 602-03.
39. Id. at 603-04 (stating that complaints and disagreements over a hospitalization decision are
not enough to diminish a parent's authority to decide what is best for a child). The Court found that
although the state had a significant interest in not imposing "unnecessary procedural obstacles that
may discourage the mentally ill or their families from seeking needed psychiatric assistance," there was
enough risk inherent in the parental decision to institutionalize a child that a procedural inquiry was
necessary by a "neutral factfinder to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission
[were] satisfied." Id. at 605-o6. In this way, the Court was able to balance all three interests,
concluding that the child's due process rights were not violated by placing control of the psychiatric
commitment decisions in the hands of the parents and hospital admitting staff. Id. at 605-07.
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separately in the balance.40
During the same term as Parham, the Court decided Bellotti v. Baird
by using the triadic balance of competing interests between the parents,
minors, and the state.4' In Bellotti, however, the Court was less willing to
defer to the parents when the issue involved the regulation of abortions
for minors by requiring parental notice and consent.42 In reviewing the
constitutionality of a state statute regulating the access of minors to
abortions, the Court separately analyzed the minors' constitutional
rights, the state's interests in protecting minors, and the parents' rights to
guide their children. 3 With respect to a minor's constitutional rights, the
Court found that while children are "protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for
children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern,... sympathy,
and... paternal attention."'" Recognizing that children still lack the
experience and judgment to identify and avoid potentially harmful
choices, the Court held that states have an interest in protecting minors
and could validly limit the freedom of children to make choices with
potentially serious consequences. 4 Finally, the Court discussed the
parents' right to have a guiding role in the upbringing of their children,
where this right would be recognized by "state deference to parental
control over children." 6 Weighing all this in the balance, the Court
determined that a mature minor had the right to make the decision
40. Id. at 604.
41. 443 U.S. 622, 639-42 (1979).
42. Id. at 642 ("The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the
abortion decision, especially when made by a minor, requires a [s]tate to act with particular sensitivity
when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter."). The Court further held that a
"[s]tate could not lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 639 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52,74 (1976))).
43. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634-39. While the Court acknowledged the separate rights of minors, it
stopped short of granting them the same degree of constitutional rights as adults. Id. The Court
justified its finding that children's rights are to be less protected from state interference, writing that
"three reasons justify[ ] the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing." Id. at 634.
44. Id. at 635 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 635-36. There are several references in the opinion to previous decisions where the
Court upheld statutes that limited a minors' First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (upholding a criminal conviction for selling sexually-oriented magazines to
a minor under the age of seventeen, when such a conviction could not have stood had the sale been to
an adult); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159, 171 (1944) (upholding an adult's conviction for
violating a child labor statute, when the adult guardian had allowed the minor to distribute religious
literature on the street after hours).
46. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637; accord Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child
is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,




After Parham and Bellotti, it is clear that the Court will consider a
minor's interests separately from his or her parents' interests when the
minor is a party.4" When a minor is not a party, the Court may decide to
use the triadic balance if there is a compelling right or interest involved.49
Comparing these two cases, in Bellotti the Court was willing to give more
weight in favor of the minors because there was a substantive
constitutional right involved-a decision involving abortion-as opposed
to merely a procedural right as in Parham." Thus, in the case of a conflict
over healthcare treatment for a minor, the decision could turn on the
strength of the minor's interest and whether there is an underlying
substantive right.
II. MAKING DECISIONS TO REFUSE TREATMENT
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme
Court held that a competent individual has the right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment.' There is much debate over whether a
minor counts as a competent individual, especially in this context. 2
Additionally, it is debatable how far this extends to a parent's right to
refuse treatment for their children. The controversy moves beyond life-
sustaining treatment and includes treatment of lesser-therapeutic value.
Deference to parental decision-making is supported by the constitutional
right of privacy in the family, which applies in the area of decision-
making for the medical treatment of children. 3 The presumptions in
favor of parents making treatment decisions for their children is based on
the same reasoning that parents will act in the best interests of their
children.54 However, as in the cases previously discussed, the state
47. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647. The result of balancing these interests was the court's creation of an
intermediate step for the minor to gain autonomy over her abortion decision. Id. The court provided
that every minor should have an opportunity to go directly to court, without first consulting or
notifying her parents, where she had a chance to persuade the court that she is mature and well
enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own. Id. If the court were
convinced then it would authorize her to act without parental notice or consent. Id.
48. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 6oo (i979).
49. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Compare Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642, with Parham, 442 U.S. at 600.
51. 497 U.S. 26I, 277-78 (i99o).
52. See generally Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and
Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under the Law, IO U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 275
(2006) (discussing how the law measures the competence of minors).
53. Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have the Right to
Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS lo9, 112 (2000).
54. See Derish & Heuvel, supra note 53, at ii2; Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It
Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 25 I, 259 (2005) ("For the most part ... parents and caretakers are the only parties legally
allowed to provide consent to healthcare for a person under the age of eighteen.... [Sitate laws rest
on a presumption that minors are incompetent and lack the ability to make cogent, mature, and
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maintains an interest in protecting the welfare of children and can
intervene under its parens patriae authority.5
Normally, when the state finds that parents have endangered their
child by failing to obtain necessary medical treatment, the state can
intervene to find the parent negligent and/or pursue criminal charges.:
The court can then appoint a guardian who will ensure that the child
receives necessary treatment. 7 However, when parents refuse treatment
for their child based on religious beliefs, there is a collision between the
parents' constitutional rights of privacy and free exercise of religion and
the state's interest in protecting the child.5 Many states have created a
compromise by exempting parents in these situations from being found
in neglect, while also providing an opening for state intervention.59
A. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION STATUTES AND PARENTAL REFUSAL OF
TREATMENT
When Congress first addressed the issue of religious-based refusal of
medical treatment, it created a compromise by enacting provisions that
acknowledged both parental rights and state interests. This resulted in
many states enacting laws that protect the parents' religious freedom, but
allowed intervention under the parens patriae power to protect children
when necessary.
In 1974, Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), which created the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW)6° to provide federal guidance to the
states for the regulation of child welfare. 6' The initial version of HEW's
regulations defined "negligent treatment" of children as the "failure to
provide adequate food, clothing, or shelter," and included an exception
for parents who did not provide medical treatment based on religious
binding decisions about their own well being."); Hawkins, supra note 16, at 2075 ("In the United
States, minors are generally considered legally incompetent to consent to or refuse most forms of
medical treatment. Parents generally have the sole authority to decide whether their children will
receive such treatment, and a physician may not treat a minor without the consent of the minor's
parent or guardian." (citations omitted)).
55. See discussion supra Part II.B.
56. See Weithom, supra note 7, at 1323-26 (providing an overview of the child welfare system);
see also People v. Rippberger, 283 Cal. Rptr. II I, 122-23 (Ct. App. i99i) (holding that the failure to
provide medical care constitutes a misdemeanor).
57. Weithorn, supra note 7, at 1323-26.
58. See, e.g., Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 818-i9 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing the
balancing of a private actor's free-exercise interests against the state's compelling interest to protect
the welfare of children).
59. See infra Part II.A.
6o. Now called the Department of Health and Human Services. See U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., History of HHS, http://answers.hhs.gov/ (select "About HHS" category; then follow
"History of HHS" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (2000).
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beliefs.6' The exception recognized the parents' free exercise rights, but
also gave weight to the state's interests by providing that "such an
exception shall not preclude a court from ordering that medical services
be provided to the child when his health requires it. '63 Although the
provision allowing courts to order treatment would seem to make the
parental exception practically moot, HEW encouraged states to adopt
the exception by initially conditioning funding for state child services
programs on the state's enactment of the statutory exemptions.64 This
gave states a great financial incentive to avoid a finding of negligence for
parents who refused medical treatment for their children because of a
legitimate practice of religious beliefs. In effect, parents would not be
penalized for withholding medical treatment, but the government could
step in to override a parent's decision. This compromise appeared to
weigh heavily in favor of state interests, but cases show that the courts
mainly allowed state intervention when treatment could prevent life-
threatening conditions or stop the spread of disease.
65
In 1983, the federal government softened its support for the parental
right of refusal by taking a more neutral stance on religious exemptions.
It no longer required states to recognize a religious exception in order to
be eligible for a federal grant, leaving states free to choose whether or
not to recognize religious exemptions.66 HEW also expanded the
definition of "negligent treatment" to include the failure to provide
medical care, but left the exemptions in the regulations essentially the
62. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2 (1974) ("[A] parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious
beliefs who thereby does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason alone
shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian."); accord H.R. REP. No. 93-685, at 2767 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2763, 2767 ("First, the Committee recognized that 'negligent
treatment' is difficult to define, but it is not the intent of the Committee that a parent or guardian
legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does not provide specific medical treatment
for a child is for that reason alone considered to be a negligent parent. To clarify further, no parent or
guardian who in good faith is providing to a child treatment solely by spiritual means-such as
prayer-according to the tenets and practices of a recognized church through a duly accredited
practitioner shall for that reason alone be considered to have neglected the child.").
63. Id.; accord Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the
American Healthcare System, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, n.40 (2003).
64. This condition was removed in 1983 by the federal government. See infra note 66.
65. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d sio8, 1119-21 (Del. I991) (holding that parents were not in
neglect for refusing treatment for a child diagnosed with an advanced stage of deadly cancer and
potential success of treatment was only 40%); In re J.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 199o )
("[T]he state may compel a juvenile.., to submit to medical treatment for a contagious and
potentially life-threatening disease.").
66. 45 C.F.R. § 134 0.2(d)( 3 )(ii) (1983) ("Nothing in this Part should be construed as requiring or
prohibiting a finding of negligent treatment or maltreatment when a parent practicing his or her
religious beliefs does not, for that reason alone, provide medical treatment for a child; provided,
however, that if such a finding is prohibited, the prohibition shall not limit the administrative or judicial




same. 6' Although states were no longer required to provide exemptions,
many that had already enacted such statutes left them in place. As a
result, the jurisprudence in this area of parental refusal of treatment for
minors varies from state to state.
69
The variations of these religious exceptions resulted in a number of
inconsistencies. Despite the exemptions for civil liability, some states still
find parents criminally liable for the death of their minor child in
situations where they fail to provide medical treatment and rely solely on
spiritual healing.70 Zaven T. Saroyan argues that these prosecutions are a
violation of the Supreme Court's decision that courts should not judge
the correctness of a faith or a religion, because a criminal charge is an
implicit ruling on the correctness (or incorrectness) of a religion since
parents and doctors would not be prosecuted for manslaughter if a child
died in a hospital.7' On the other hand are arguments that the religious
exemptions are unconstitutional violations of the Equal Protection
Clause72 or the Establishment Clause.73
67. See id. § 1340.2 (1983).
68. See ALASKA STAT. §§ II.51.I20(b), 47.I7.O2o(d) (2005); ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6 (2006); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 270, 11165.2(b) (West 2006); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300, 16509.1, 18950.5 (West
2oo6); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-1030) (West 2006); D.C. CODE § 16-2301 (9)(B); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-II-2(8)(D) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4oi, -1501 (2006); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3(g)
(2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-5 (LexisNexis 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608 (2006); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 557 (2006); id. tit. 22, § 4010 (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.378, 626.556
(West 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169 -C:3 (XIX)(c) (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 852, 852.1
(West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-7-16, 26-8A-23 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-io2 (2005);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109, -I1O (2005); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-228, 18.2-371.1(C) (2006); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 948.03 (2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-201 (2006).
69. Congress has essentially left this up to the states. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 51o6i(b) (West 2006)
("Except with respect to the withholding of medically indicated treatments from disabled infants with
life threatening conditions, case by case determinations concerning the exercise of the authority of this
subsection shall be within the sole discretion of the State.").
70. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 870 (Cal. 1988) (upholding the conviction of
the parent of a girl who died from meningitis even though they were exercising legitimate and sincere
Christian Scientist beliefs); People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243, 246-47 (N.Y. 1903) (finding a parent
belonging to the Christian Catholic Church of Chicago guilty for infant daughter's death from
pneumonia); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.zd 616, 624-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding
members of Faith Tabernacle Church liable for the death of their son from a tumor).
71. Zaven T. Saroyan, Spiritual Healing and the Free Exercise Clause: An Argument for the Use of
Strict Scrutiny, 12 B.U. PuB. Ir. L.J. 363, 365-66 (2003). Saroyan uses an illustration of two children
with meningitis who both die. Id. One child was treated solely through spiritual healing and the other
with conventional medicine. Id. at 366. According to Saroyan, in many states, the parents who relied
on spiritual healing would be prosecuted for manslaughter whereas the doctor of the other child would
be free from criminal charges. Id. Zaroyan argues that when the state charges only one party, despite
identical results, then "the state is implicitly asserting that one method is correct, and one is not." Id.;
accord United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85-88 (1944) (explaining that the truth or falsity of
religious beliefs is not for the courts to judge because an attempt at such a determination is a
"forbidden domain" based on the First Amendment).
72. Rita Swan, On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to Medical Care: Can this
Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73, 92 (1998). Swan argues that religious
exemptions create two classes of citizenship: (i) children who have access to medical care, and (2)
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In non-criminal cases where parents assert the right of refusal, the
decision seems to turn on a number of factors relating to the strength of
the state's interest which includes the danger to the child, the potential
success of the treatment being refused, and the danger to others in the
case of communicable diseases. For example, in Newmark v. Williams,
three-year-old Colin Newmark was diagnosed with an advanced stage of
deadly cancer, but his parents, who were Christian Scientists, rejected
medical treatment that was proposed for the child.74 The state petitioned
for custody of the child, but the court upheld the parents' decision.75 The
court determined that the child was not neglected by his parents' refusal
of treatment because the invasive chemotherapy had only a 40% chance
of success and there was a very real risk that the treatment itself might
cause the child to die.76 The court concluded there was insufficient
justification to allow the state to intervene at the expense of the parents'
autonomy.77 Thus the religious issues were not as relevant because the
court looked at other factors such as the risk of treatment against the
chance of success."' These other elements tipped the scales in favor of the
parents' decision to refuse treatment, making it unnecessary for the court
to fully examine the issues related to religious freedom.
In Newmark, if the potential physical consequences from the
medical treatment had not been so drastic and Colin's chances of survival
had been higher, the court might have reached a different decision.
Under those circumstances the parents' religious interests could have
played a bigger role in the court's decision. However, even if the parents
are protected by a religious exemption and the court considers their free
exercise rights, it does not necessarily result in a decision favorable to the
parents. In In re D.L.E., the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
statutory religious exemption did not preclude a finding of dependency
and neglect when a minor was suffering from a life-threatening medical
condition due to a failure to comply with a program of medical
treatment. 79 The statute in question provided that "'no child who in good
faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in
children in "faith-healing sects" who have no access to treatment unless a state agency becomes aware
of their needs. Id. at 95.
73. See Misty Boyer, Comment, Death by Religious Exemption: Parents Refusing Their Child
Necessary Medical Treatment Based Upon Their Own Religious Beliefs-Should States Endorse a
System that Denies Necessary Medical Treatment to Children?, 4 WHI'rIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 147,
152, 158-6o (2004).
74. 588 A.2d Iio8, Ii09 (Del. I99I).
75. Id. at III9-21.
76. Id.
77. Id. at III8.
78. Id. The court also looked at other factors, but focused on the low probability of success. Id. at
114, 1117-19.
79. In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1982).
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accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or
religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for
that reason alone, be considered to have been neglected."' 8 D.L.E., a
minor who suffered epileptic seizures due to brain damage at birth, put
his life in imminent danger by refusing to take his prescribed medicine -
a decision his mother supported.8' The state brought an action to declare
the child dependent and neglected. " The court held that the exemption
statute did not confer a defense to a finding of dependency and neglect,
by interpreting the phrase "for that reason alone" to mean that other
reasons, such as whether the child's life was in imminent danger, would
justify a finding of dependency. 3 Thus, the language of the statute
allowed the Colorado Supreme Court to find in favor of the state's
interest to protect the child's welfare.
Imminent danger is not necessarily the threshold that triggers state
intervention. The state can also have a compelling interest when there is
a potentially life-threatening disease, particularly when that condition is
contagious and therefore likely to affect the welfare of others. In the case
of an adolescent and his mother who were in agreement in refusing
treatment based on religious grounds for the boy's gonorrhea, the court
found that the state's interests were strong enough to violate the
juvenile's religious beliefs due to the nature of the contagious and
potentially life-threatening disease.4
With the exception of this last case, the courts in these treatment-
refusal cases did not examine the interests of the minor because they
were either too young or else in agreement with their parents' decisions.
The court in In re J.J. however, framed the issue as a question of whether
a juvenile had the right to refuse treatment.5 In its opinion, the court
made it clear that the state would not have been able to compel an adult
in the same situation to undergo medical treatment. The following
section examines the extent of adolescent rights in healthcare decision-
making.
8o. Id. at 272 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-114 (I973)). The Colorado statute provided:
No child who in lieu of medical treatment is under treatment solely by spiritual means
through prayer in accordance with a recognized method of religious healing shall, for that
reason alone, be considered to have been neglected or dependent within the purview of this
article. However, the religious rights of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian shall not limit
the access of a child to medical care in a life-threatening situation or when the condition will
result in serious disability.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103.
81. D.L.E., 64 5 P.2d at 272-73.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 274-75.
84. In re J.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 199o).
85. Id. at 1139-40.
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B. ADOLESCENT RIGHTS-THE MATURE MINOR
In general, parents and caretakers are the only parties who can
legally provide consent to healthcare for persons under the age of
eighteen. 86 However, there are a number of areas where the law provides
exceptions allowing minors to seek healthcare with the same or almost
the same autonomy as adults: I) pregnancy and abortion decisions,"7
2) treatment for certain diseases such as STDs and drug or alcohol
dependency, S8 3) the common law doctrine of the mature minor,89 and
4) emancipated minors.9'
With respect to reproductive rights, the Supreme Court has created
an exception to allow mature minors to make their own abortion
decisions without needing parental consent.' The Supreme Court first
recognized abortion as a constitutional right in Roe v. Wade and held
that the government could not prohibit abortions prior to viability of the
fetus.2 The government can regulate abortions prior to viability as long
as it does not place an "undue burden" on the access to abortion. 3 With
regard to minors, the Court held in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth that "[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."94 In Danforth, the
Court struck down a law requiring the consent of a parent in order for an
unmarried minor to obtain an abortion.9" The Court examined the
competing interests of safeguarding parental authority and the privacy
rights of a competent mature minor, concluding that requiring parental
consent as an absolute condition to obtaining an abortion was a violation
86. Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 259.
87. Id. at 264. But see Rosato, Adolescent Empowerment, supra note iI, at 773-74. Professor
Rosato argues that despite the protection of undue burden, states are still able to limit a girl's abortion
rights significantly without violating the Constitution. Id.
88. Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 269.
89. Id. at 268-69.
9
o
. Id. at 266.
95. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,74 (1976).
92. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). Viability is defined as the point where a fetus is potentially able
to live outside its mother's womb with or without artificial aid. Id. The time could be as early as
twenty-four weeks but is usually placed at around twenty-eight weeks. Id. at i6o.
93. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-78 (1992) (defining "undue burden" as "a
state regulation [which] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus").
94. 428 U.S. at 74 (declaring that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority").
95. Id. at 75. The provision at issue stated that
"[n]o abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
except... (4) [w]ith the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the
woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion
is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother."
Id. at 85 (quoting I8 PA. CONS. STATE. § 3205 (1990)).
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of a minor's rights under Roe.6 The following year, the Court affirmed
that "the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting
procreation extends to minors as well as to adults."' Thus, in a number
of states, pregnant adolescents are granted adult status, and their
healthcare providers have no legal obligation or right to report the
pregnancy to the parents or guardians of the patient." With regard to
abortions, some states have enacted parental notification requirements,
but the Court has found these valid only when a judicial bypass option
exists.'
Because abortion is a recognized right, there are constitutional
reasons to empower adolescents to make their own decisions in this area.
However, public policy rationales also support granting more autonomy
to adolescents to make healthcare decisions for other forms of treatment
which are personal in nature. For example, in order to encourage
adolescents to get treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, minors
may consent to treatment without the knowledge or consent of their
parents or guardian."° This also applies to treatment for drug or alcohol
dependency, mental health services, some emergency situations, and in
some states, for care related to sexual assault.'' The justification for
these exceptions is based on the assumption that adolescents will be less
likely to seek treatment in these areas if they have to first get consent
from their parents. 2 Society pays a high cost when minors do not receive
treatment for these ailments, and this cost is greater than the loss to
parental autonomy.' °3 Applying the triadic balance, the compelling state
interests, which are closely related to the minor's interest, outweigh
parental autonomy.
Minors who are not suffering from the aforementioned medical
issues can still attain some degree of autonomy under the "mature
minor" doctrine. This is a common law exception recognized by some
96. Id. at 75; id. at 9o-i (Stewart & Powell, JJ. concurring).
97. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977).
98. See Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 263-64 n.39.
99. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (I979) ("[I]f the State decides to require a
pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an
alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.").
too. Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 264.
IoI. Id. at 264-66.
102. See Tomas J. Silber, Ethical Considerations in Caring for Adolescents, to PEDIATRIC ANNALS
408, 409 (98) ("[Many adolescents who need access to medical care in order to better protect their
health would never consult a doctor if they knew he would require parental consent prior to
treatment."). The justification is therefore based more on practical and ethical concerns, rather than in
particular beliefs about adolescent capacity for decision-making. Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 269-71.
103. Martin T. Harvey, Adolescent Competency and the Refusal of Medical Treatment, 13 HEALTH
MATRIX 297, 300 (2003) (referring to the "utilitarian interest of preventing suicide, curbing illicit drug
and alcohol abuse and halting the spread of venereal disease" as justification for adolescent consent to
treatment); Rosato, Adolescent Empowerment, supra note I I, at 778.
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courts, which allows a minor to consent to his own treatment without
having to obtain his or her parents' consent."4 The minor must prove he
or she is "sufficiently competent to make the medical decision," which
usually requires a court determination of whether the minor understands
the treatment and all the consequences. 5
The last exception grants emancipated minors the ability to make
their own treatment decisions. Minors can become emancipated based on
their age, through a court order, or other life situation.' 6 However, evenin this case the minor does not always have the same rights as an adult.'"
C. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Achieving the proper balance between deference to parents and
adolescent autonomy requires delicate fact-based considerations because
there are potential dangers on both sides. Requiring only parental
consent without input from the minor could allow parents to avoid
difficult conversations with their children about their illness to the harm
of the child. Some parents may "protect" their child by shielding her
from information about the prognosis. They may falsely tell her that she
104. Rosato, Adolescent Empowerment, supra note I I, at 789-90.
105. Id.
io6. Minors can seek a court order when living independently from their parents. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE §§ 26-13- I, -2, -4, -6 (1992); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7002 (West 2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/3-
i /3-2, /4, /5 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.341 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-59.1
(LexisNexis 2002). Minors can also be emancipated based on their status. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4
(LexisNexis 1997) (providing that minor must be fourteen or older and must be a high school
graduate, married or pregnant); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2o-9-602 (2005);
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6911, 6922 (providing that minor must be living apart from parents and must
manage his or her own financial affairs); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 743.064, .0645 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4302, -4303 (2002). Minors can consent to medical procedures. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 210/I (West 2005) (providing that minor must be married, a parent themselves, or have parental
consent); IND. CODE ANN. § 1
6
-36-I-3(A) (LexisNexis 1993) (providing that minor must be
emancipated, married, divorced, in the military, authorized by statute, or fourteen or older and living
away from parents); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-I23B (2000) (requiring minor to be sixteen or older); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185 (West 2005); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20- 102 (LexisNexis 2005):
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (West 1999) (providing that minor must have intelligence to understand
procedure and its consequences); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402 (2005) (providing that minor must be
married, pregnant, a high school graduate, emancipated, living apart from parents, or financially self-
supporting if the health care is for minor's child); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.030 (LexisNexis 2004)
(providing that minor must be living apart from parents for four months, married or been married, a
mother, in danger of a serious health hazard, or able to understand the nature, purpose, and need for
medical care and voluntarily request the care); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4 (West 2002) (providing that
a healthcare provider may inform parents at its discretion); OR. REV. STAT. § io9.640, .650 (2005)
(providing that minor must be fifteen or older and the healthcare provider may involve the parents);
28 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 27.97 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-I (2001) (providing that minor
must be sixteen or older, married, or a parent); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-280 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 63-6-229 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.I-2969(A)-(B) (2005) (requiring a court order to authorize a
medical procedure); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-I-OI(B) (2005) (providing that minor must be legally
married, on active duty in the military, treatment need must be urgent, and parents or guardian cannot
be located, or minor must be living apart from parents and managing her own affairs).
107. See infra note I I I and accompanying text.
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will get better in the belief that this saves the child from unhappiness and
the possibility of an inadvertent premature death. This is detrimental
because a child is often aware that something is wrong, and deception by
caregivers and parents will heighten her sense of alienation, disconnect
and powerlessness created by the illness."
On the other hand, some states allow young people in crisis
moments-pregnancy, drug dependency, sexually transmitted diseases-
to access healthcare without parental knowledge, and providers lack
clear guidelines about their authority or legal responsibility to involve an
adult caretaker."° Consequently, helpful parental guidance is
unnecessarily lost."'
The law dealing with adolescent decision-making autonomy reflects
the confusion and contradictions of the larger society."' Given that
adolescence is a state in between childhood and adulthood, the law has
struggled to regulate the lives of young people by establishing a test that
rejects inflexible presumptions of both childhood dependence and adult
independence. Professor Mutcherson noted, "[a]s the culture shifts,
lawmakers re-draw the lines of adolescence and respond to debate about
the borders of adulthood .... Adolescent rights are a "'patchwork quilt of
rights and limitations"' creating incongruous situations where "'a teenage
mother must give consent before her baby may be treated,"' but cannot
consent to her own healthcare, or an adolescent boy can be treated for
HIV without parental consent, but must get parental consent to set his
broken leg."3
These inconsistencies stem from the current range of rationales used
to legally recognize adolescent autonomy while protecting parental rights
as well. The effect of expanding adolescent rights is that parental
autonomy rights constrict as a result. This may explain why the
exceptions for adolescent autonomy have been based on utilitarian
reasons rather than any criteria of adolescent capacity." '4 In many cases,
lO8. See Mutcherson, supra note 54, at 278-79.
to9. Id.
Iio. Id. at 279-80.
III. Id. at 257; see In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). The court
recognized that the lack of a bright-line rule results in inconsistencies in how minors are treated under
the law. Id. For instance, seventeen-year-olds in criminal proceedings are deemed capable of making
all decisions relative to the proceeding. Id. Emancipated minors and minors who are married, divorced
or widowed can consent to medical treatment. Id. However, there are no exceptions that allow a minor
to purchase alcohol or tobacco, nor allowing them to vote or serve on juries. Id.
112. Mutcherson, supra note 54 at 257.
I13. Id. at 269 (quoting Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127,
127 (1996)); accord Rosato, Adolescent Empowerment, supra note t t, at 777-78.
114. Andrew Newman, Adolescent Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical Treatment: A Proposal
to Simplify the Law of Teenage Medical Decision-Making, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 506 (2OO1) (stating
that maturity operates as a "code word," allowing minors to consent to their own treatment where
society deems it appropriate and denies access if there is the real possibility of long-term
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the determination to expand the rights of minors was not based on a
belief that adolescents are mature, but rather on a societal determination
to prevent unwanted consequences."5 The exception for certain
conditions or diseases serves public policy because it encourages teens to
seek medical treatment without having to speak to their parents.
However, it does not provide a basis for adopting a mature minor
doctrine that is actually based on maturity."6
In response to this, Susan D. Hawkins argues for a "rebuttable
presumption of competence," saying that if the individual making the
assessment of competence cannot demonstrate that the minor lacks
capacity, then the minor should be able to participate fully in the
decision-making process."' This approach would essentially take the
Danforth decision and shift the burden of proof from the minor to the
adult making the challenge. Professor Harvey proposes a "sliding scale"
approach where the competency bar for a child should depend on the
therapeutic benefit of the treatment being considered. I8 In Professor
Harvey's view, a terminally ill adolescent patient who is refusing a life-
prolonging treatment with low therapeutic benefit would have a stronger
argument for competency than a high-school football player with a
potentially fatal heart valve defect who is refusing a life-saving treatment
because the surgery would mean he could never play football again. '
Another argument draws a bright-line rule that "minors who are
emancipated from their parents and who are thus responsible for
themselves and for planning and living their own lives as any normal
adult" should have all of the same rights as an adult when it comes to the
right to refuse life-saving treatment.120
Research on adolescent decision-making capabilities supports the
argument for moving from utilitarian-based reasons to adolescent
capacity-based reasons. Professor Hartman defines capacity as an
"elusive standard" which includes an individual's ability to "understand
information, deliberate rationally about information, and communicate
concerns and choices.'12  Professor Hartman found that studies
supported the determination that adolescents have a capacity level
compatible with legal recognition for decision-making.'" In situations of
consequences).
115. Id. at 507.
iI6. Rosato, Adolescent Empowerment, supra note I * at 778.
117. Hawkins, supra note 16, at 2129.
si8. Harvey, supra note 103, at 315 tbl.i.
ii9. Id. at309.
12o. David N. Kessler, Comment, Praying for Relief from Parens Patriae: Should a Child be
Allowed to Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment on Religious Grounds?, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POLY 673,692 (1985-1987).




unplanned pregnancy as well as primary care, adolescents showed a
maturity in judgment comparable to young adults in the same situation.' 3
However, another layer of complexity is added in the case of
treatment refusal based on religious beliefs. Under the triadic balance,
the analysis above supports granting more weight to the adolescent's
preferences when she desires treatment against her parents' religious
objections. However, in the situation where a minor is refusing treatment
based on religion contrary to the parents' wishes, courts must weigh the
adolescent's religious beliefs against the various state and parental
interests.
III. FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
The free exercise clause of the Constitution protects an individual's
freedom of religious belief, but the Supreme Court has ruled that the
government can place limitations on the practice of those beliefs.' 4 In
many of the cases examined in this Note, the government has intervened
to restrict the religious practices of parents when those actions affected
the welfare of their children. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the government
could not have convicted Mrs. Prince for distributing religious literature
on the street if she had been alone, but when her exercise of religious
freedom violated child labor laws the state was able to act.' 5 Although
her niece stated it was her choice and claimed religious freedom, the
Court held that "the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is true in the
case of other freedoms."' 16 The Court justified its dual limitations on both
a parent and child's religious freedoms: "Parents may be free to become
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves."'2 7
In many states, children reach "the age of full and legal discretion '' 8
at eighteen, and until that age children are not automatically entitled to
the same protections as adults. However, many adolescents demonstrate
a fair amount of maturity prior to the legal age, creating a justification
for recognizing more rights for minors. Determining a requisite level of
maturity and measuring individual capacity is undoubtedly difficult, and
123. Id.
124. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (holding that despite their religious
beliefs and convictions, defendants were not exempt from being convicted under the state's criminal
anti-polygamy statute).






the inconsistencies in the law reflect this challenge. Sometimes the legal
system presents adolescents as especially vulnerable to religious ideas
and societal pressures.' 9 Other times, courts emphasize the maturity of
the adolescents and their ability to resist religious ideas and social
pressures.'30 In other contexts, courts do not consider the maturity of the
adolescents; the courts either assume that the religious rights of the
children are adequately represented in their parents' rights'3 ' or frame
the adolescent's rights as a class between the parental rights and
government interests.'
32
However, recall that Justice Douglas's dissent in Yoder argued for
the recognition of an adolescent's religious freedom and right to make
decisions despite their parents' religious objections.'33 Recent data seems
to support Justice Douglas's position on giving more weight to an
adolescent's religious choices within the context of decision-making
when there is a conflict with the parent. Surveys revealed that a large
percentage of American teenagers aged thirteen to seventeen professed
a certain amount of religious beliefs.'34 Ninety-seven percent said they
believed in God; 8o% viewed religion as at least fairly important to them;
and 93% reported being affiliated with a religious group or
denomination.' 3 Additionally, more than half said they regularly
engaged in religious practices.' 36 But most surprisingly, more than one
quarter of the teens considered their spiritual life to be more important
to them than it was to their parents, and more than three-quarters said
they were confident that they would grow up to be more religious than
their parents.'37 Psychological data also support adolescent capacity for
religious belief, finding that from the beginning of adolescence children
understand the symbolic properties of religious scriptures stories and
grasp complex aspects of religious morality. 35 This evidence supports
129. See, e.g., Santa Fe Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
130. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) ("[Slecondary school students are
mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech
that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.").
131. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2oo1) ("[T]o the extent
we consider whether the community would feel coercive pressure to engage in the Club's activities...
the relevant community would be the parents, not the elementary school children.").
132. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (972).
133. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("And if an Amish child desires to attend high school, and
is mature enough to have that desire respected, the State may well be able to override the parents'
religiously motivated objections.").
134. ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, NOT BY FAITH ALONE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ADOLESCENCE 3 (2002).
135. Id.
136. Id. This included activities such as praying alone, attending church or synagogue, frequently
reading scriptures, or being involved with religiously affiliated youth groups. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Pascal Boyer & Sheila Walker, Intuitive Ontology and Cultural Input in the Acquisition of
Religious Concepts, in IMAGINING THE IMPOSSIBLE: MAGICAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND RELIGIOUS THINKING IN
CHILDREN 141 (Karl S. Rosengren et al. eds., 200o). In their conclusion, Boyer & Walker state that at
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protecting an adolescent's free exercise rights to the same extent as an
adult's rights. Justice Douglas concluded that "children are 'persons'
within the meaning of the Bill of Rights,.' 39 a statement strongly implying
that minors' free exercise rights are coextensive with those of adults.'40
As with adolescent autonomy in the area of healthcare, many
distinct arguments exist in the area of free exercise rights for minors.
Professor Emily Buss agrees with expanding the recognition of children's
free exercise rights; however, she argues for a certain amount of
restraint, asserting that the state will do more harm than good if it plays
an active role in eliciting children's religious beliefs.'4' Zaven T. Saroyan
argues for the use of strict scrutiny in cases where free exercise rights
come up against a child's fundamental rights and the state's interest in
protecting the welfare of the child.'42 Strict scrutiny can attain the balance
between the two extremes of either a complete ban on state intrusion or
else complete state control of the issue. '
In summary, the Court has indicated that with respect to religious
freedoms, the state has more control over a child's exercise of rights than
it does over an adult's.'" The challenge is to find the balance between the
freedoms of parents and children when the exercise of religious beliefs
affects the health and welfare of the child.
IV. MERGING THE DOCTRINES
The Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of a three-way
competition of interests between parents, children, and the state with
respect to religious freedoms.'45 However, after Parham and Bellotti,
courts have a model for addressing conflicts within the family through a
middle-childhood "children develop a much stricter distinction between magical, religious
representations and fiction," suggesting that at that point children have the mental capacity for
religious belief. Id. at 151; accord Kessler, supra note i2o, at 676-78 (arguing that older children can
have sincere religious beliefs).
139. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972).
140. See id. at 244.
141. Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53. 53 (i999) ("While I
share Douglas's view that the Yoder decision is deficient in its account of children's rights, I think
Douglas's cure is worse than the disease."); accord Matt Steinberg, Note, Free Exercise of Religion:
The Conflict Between a Parent's Rights and a Minor Child's Right in Determining the Religion of the
Child, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 219, 234 (995) (arguing that a mature child should be granted the
constitutional right to assert an independent religious belief which takes precedence over his or her
parents' right to determine the religious upbringing of their children).
142. Saroyan, supra note 71, at 364.
143. Id.
144. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. i58, 170 (1944) ("We think that with reference to the public
proclaiming of religion, upon the streets and in other similar public places, the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is true in the
case of other freedoms, and the rightful boundary of its power has not been crossed in this case.").
145. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231 ("Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible
competing interests of parents, children, and the [s]tate.").
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balancing of the interests of the state, the parents, and the child. The
Bellotti Court recognized that it was in the state's interest to have a
family make these decisions as opposed to resorting to a judicial
resolution."'6 When a court is called upon to make a decision, it should
take into account a parent's natural interest in the welfare of his child-
an interest that is stronger in normal family relationships where the child
is living with one or both parents.'47
Different issues arise in the two scenarios of children disagreeing
with their parents over healthcare decisions. In the first scenario, parents
refuse treatment for their child based on their own religious beliefs, but
the minor himself wishes to obtain medical care. Recall the Newmark
case, where three-year-old Colin had been diagnosed with terminal
cancer and the available medical treatment had only a 40% chance
success rate with potentially deadly side effects."'" Due to the low
probability of treatment success, the court weighed the separate interests
of the state and parents, ultimately upholding the parents' decision to
refuse treatment for their child based on religious beliefs.' 49 The court did
not consider the minor's interests separately in that case since he was
only three, but suppose a hypothetical situation where a teenager suffers
from the same form of cancer as Colin Newmark with identically bleak
treatment prospects. While this teenager's parents refuse medical
treatment for him because of their own religious beliefs, he himself
wishes to get treatment for his disease. If this case went to trial, under the
Bellotti and Parham framework, the court would need to consider the
interests of the teenager in addition to those of the parents and state.
In previous cases when parents used their own religious beliefs as
the basis for refusing treatment for a minor, the courts evaluated the
danger to the welfare of a minor purely from a medical health
perspective.'50 Based on the arguments in Part III supporting the
recognition of a minor's religious beliefs, courts should also weigh the
infringement upon a minor's free exercise rights. Professor Rhonda
Hartman's findings about adolescent capacity add to the weight that
courts should give to the adolescent's interests.'"' Under Danforth the
Court found that the constitutional right to abortion applied to minors
and that the government could not place an absolute bar on a minor's
ability to obtain an abortion by requiring parental consent. '52 The
146. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,648 (I979).
147. Id.
148. See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d iio8, iIo8 (Del. ig9i).
149. Id. at 1119-21.
150. See, e.g., id.
151. Hartman, supra note 121.




argument follows that allowing a parent's religious beliefs to dictate an
adolescent's decision about medical treatment violates the minor's
constitutional rights of privacy and religion. Using the triadic balance in
this situation, the state's interest in protecting the welfare of minors and
the adolescent's interests weigh in favor of deferring to the adolescent
rather than the parents.
Looking to the hypothetical above, the separate interests can be
broken down. The state has an interest in protecting the welfare of the
minor. Because the cancer is terminal and the medical treatment itself is
not guaranteed to cure but could instead cause death, from a health
perspective the state's interests to protect the minor's welfare are no
stronger whether or not the teenager receives treatment. The parents
have a fundamental right to make decisions for their child, so their
interests would be protected by the court upholding the treatment
refusal. Lastly, the teenager has both an interest to make autonomous
healthcare decisions and to have his free exercise rights upheld by not
being forced to adhere to a religious standard that is not his own.
Weighing this in the balance, it seems that the teenager should be
allowed to receive treatment for his cancer regardless of the low
probability of success. If the hypothetical were modified so that the
medical treatment had a higher probability of success, then the support
for allowing the teenager to receive treatment over his parents'
objections increases because the state's interest in protecting the minor
also increases. Thus, in this scenario, the adolescent's desire to receive
treatment should always overcome his or her parents' objections to
treatment based on religious beliefs.
A second scenario may be used to explore a minor's rights to refuse
treatment for herself based on her own religious beliefs. In this case, the
treatment preferences from the original scenario are switched. The
teenager, suffering from a deadly form of cancer with low probability of
treatment success, now wishes to refuse treatment based on her own
religious beliefs while her parents wish to obtain medical treatment for
her. The issue here is whether the teenager's free exercise rights should
be granted such weight that they overcome both the state's interest to
protect her welfare and her parents' fundamental rights to make
decisions about the family.
Using the triadic balance here, it seems that the adolescent's
interests are potentially much weaker in comparison to the other
interests at stake. Although Justice Douglas's argument in Yoder
provides a strong argument for granting heavy weight to the adolescent
interest, the factual context of his arguments had far less serious
ramifications. Justice Douglas discussed the possibility of allowing
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adolescents to decide to continue their formal education against their
parents' wishes.'53 Here the potential consequences from a decision to
refuse healthcare are quite different than the possible harm that could
result from a bad educational decision. The gravity of the consequences
depends on the seriousness of the illness and the probability of treatment
success. Professor Martin Harvey looks at therapeutic benefit as a
combination of the seriousness of the illness and the probability of
treatment success.'54 He creates a sliding scale in which he proposes that
the strength of a minor's right to refuse should depend on the therapeutic
benefit of the treatment being considered and the nature of the
treatment intervention-life-saving, life-sustaining, or life-prolonging.'55
Professor Harvey argues that adolescents should have no right to refuse
treatment that has high therapeutic benefit, but a strong right to refuse
treatment with low therapeutic benefit.
6
In this hypothetical, the teenager is in a situation with a low
therapeutic benefit. Despite the deadliness of her cancer, the potential
success of the chemotherapy treatment is low, and there is a risk that the
treatment itself will have fatal consequences. Her interests are based on
autonomy and free exercise, which go directly against her parents'
interests in making decisions for their child. Similar to the analysis under
the previous hypothetical, the state's interests to protect the welfare of
children come out neutral in the triadic balance, but the state interest to
protect the minor's autonomy and constitutional rights are much
stronger. Under Newmark, parents faced with making the same decision
for their child had refused treatment and the decision was upheld by the
court.'57 It follows that if the teenager's parents were in agreement with
her, then the state would not compel treatment. If she were an adult,
again the state would not compel treatment because she would be able to
make an autonomous decision."' Thus, using the arguments for a mature
minor standard and the arguments supporting an adolescent's capacity
for religious belief, the teenager's decision should be given more weight
than that of her parents.
However, the analysis changes as the therapeutic benefit increases.
While free exercise prohibits the government from infringing on an
153. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205, 241-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. Harvey, supra note 103, at 316.
155. Id.
156. Id. Harvey creates a table designating three levels of therapeutic benefit: (i) High therapeutic
benefit means the treatment is life-saving. Id. The patient's short and long-term prognoses are
excellent, with a near-full recovery expected from their illness. Id. (2) Moderate means that the long-
term prognosis is problematic, but the treatment will provide the patient with a few additional years of
life, although the overall quality of life may have little improvement. Id. (3) Low therapeutic benefit
means that both the patient's short- and long-term prognoses are extremely poor. Id.
157. See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1 lO8, I I i9-2I (Del. I991).
158. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (199o).
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individual's religious belief, our society places limits on religious
practices that are illegal or could cause harm. The greater the therapeutic
benefit of medical treatment, the greater the harm that could result from
refusing such treatment. Despite the need to protect an individual's free
exercise rights, the state's interests to protect the welfare of the minor
and others give it the right to limit the individual's actions. For example,
in In re J.J., the court ordered treatment for a sexually transmitted
disease over the adolescent's refusal based on religion because the state
had an interest to prevent further transmissions of the disease. '59 The
treatment in this case had a high therapeutic benefit. In that case, the
adolescent's parent was in agreement with him and supported his
decision to refuse treatment. If the parent had desired for the minor to
receive medical treatment in that situation, the case for compelling
treatment would have been even stronger. Although the In re J.J. case
was unique in that the state's interest also included a concern to protect
the welfare of others,6' the analysis would not change very much if this
element is removed.
For example, suppose the teenager is suffering from thyroid cancer,
which is highly treatable with proven rates of success.' 6' Medical
treatment would be life-saving and have a high therapeutic benefit.
Unlike a sexually transmitted disease, the consequences of refusing
treatment in this situation would only harm the patient since it is a non-
communicable disease. This, though, would not weaken the state's
interests to such an extent that the balance shifts in favor of the teenager.
Looking at the triadic balance, the state still has a compelling interest to
protect the welfare of the minor. The parents' interests are the same, and
the presumption that they are acting in the best interests of their child
would not be in question. While the minor has a free exercise right here,
the practice of his beliefs-refusing medical treatment-would have
harmful consequences. In such a scenario, the strength of the state and
parents' interests should be enough to compel treatment for the child
over his religious objections. Using this sliding-scale approach based on
therapeutic benefit, the result essentially favors an adolescent's physical
life and health over his religious faith.
CONCLUSION
The triadic balancing test for weighing the various interests of
parents, children, and the state is readily applicable to situations of
conflict over healthcare decision-making. While courts may grant more
autonomy to adolescents in the area of medical treatment decisions, it is
159. 582 N.E.2d 1138, 1141-42 (Ohio Ct. App. 199o).
i6o. Id. at 1141.
161. See EndocrineWeb.com, Thyroid Cancer, http://www.endocrineweb.com/thyroidca.html (last
visited Jan. 4, 2007).
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important to use a sliding-scale to determine the appropriate weight of
the adolescent's interests in comparison to those of the parents and the
state. When parents refuse treatment for their child based on religious
beliefs, the triadic balance almost always results in a favorable decision
for the minor. In those cases, the state's interest will be to protect the
welfare of the minor. However, in the case of a minor's refusal of
treatment, courts should carefully look at all the factors to determine the
strength of the minor's interests as compared with those of the state and
the parents. As the level of therapeutic benefit increases, so will the
weight of the state and parents' interests in the balance.
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